18. I understand what Pascal's Wager is all about

As usually framed, Pascal's Wager runs as follows:
If God exists and I believe in Him, I'll go to heaven (which is an infinitely good thing) as long as I act correctly on earth (which may be a finitely bad thing, as I'll have to abjure prostitutes and other forms of moral incontinency I might otherwise enjoy).
So if God doesn't exist, I'll exchange a finite cost for no return.
But if God does exist and I don't believe in Him, I'm infinitely worse off, because I'll either miss out on heaven, or end up in hell, which would be infinitely bad.
If we multiply the probability of God's existence by the reward for believing in Him, we find we still have an infinite benefit, whereas we only have finite risks and rewards if we don't believe in Him.
Thus, it's rational, as any student of statistics would tell you in a trice, to believe in God.
Keeping up so far?
Where my superiority is demonstrated is that you probably thought that was it: Pascal computes his expectations and then goes off and starts believing in God. But that isn't the deal here. What Pascal actually points out is that although he's shown that it would be rational to believe in God, on the basis of the expected reward, that's not enough. You still have to go to church and inculcate religious beliefs and practices, otherwise you're not being sincere, and that's what counts, rather than a rational choice to bet your life's path on the possible existence of a deity.
Now, of course, you know that. But you didn't use to, did you? And thus you'll always have understood the consequences of Pascal's wager for a shorter time than me.